Computational extensive-form games

Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We define solution concepts appropriate for computationally bounded players playing a fixed finite game. To do so, we need to define what it means for a computational game, which is a sequence of games that get larger in some appropriate sense, to represent a single finite underlying extensive-form game. Roughly speaking, we require all the games in the sequence to have essentially the same structure as the underlying game, except that two histories that are indistinguishable (i.e., in the same information set) in the underlying game may correspond to histories that are only computationally indistinguishable in the computational game. We define a computational version of both Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium for computational games, and show that every Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the underlying game corresponds to a computational Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the computational game. One advantage of our approach is that if a cryptographic protocol represents an abstract game, then we can analyze its strategic behavior in the abstract game, and thus separate the cryptographic analysis of the protocol from the strategic analysis.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Pages681-698
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781450339360
DOIs
StatePublished - 21 Jul 2016
Externally publishedYes
Event17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2016 - Maastricht, Netherlands
Duration: 24 Jul 201628 Jul 2016

Publication series

NameEC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2016
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityMaastricht
Period24/07/1628/07/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Computational Mathematics

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