Complexity of shift bribery in committee elections

Robert Bredereck; Piotr Faliszewski; Rolf Niedermeier; Nimrod Talmon

Complexity of shift bribery in committee elections

Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

We study the (parameterized) complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY for multiwinner voting rules. We focus on the SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and Chamberlin-Courant rules, as well as on approximate variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule, since the original rule is NP-hard to compute. We show that SHIFT BRIBERY tends to be significantly harder in the multiwinner setting than in the single-winner one by showing settings where SHIFT BRIBERY is easy in the single-winner cases, but is hard (and hard to approximate) in the multiwinner ones. We show that the non-monotonicity of those rules which are based on approximation algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant rule sometimes affects the complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY.

Original language	American English
Title of host publication	30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
Pages	2452-2458
Number of pages	7
ISBN (Electronic)	9781577357605
State	Published - 1 Jan 2016
Externally published	Yes
Event	30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 - Phoenix, United States Duration: 12 Feb 2016 → 17 Feb 2016

Publication series

Name	30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016

Conference

Conference	30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
Country/Territory	United States
City	Phoenix
Period	12/02/16 → 17/02/16

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

@inproceedings{a4f5c5dde1f84ff0813e05553552ddc2,

title = "Complexity of shift bribery in committee elections",

abstract = "We study the (parameterized) complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY for multiwinner voting rules. We focus on the SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and Chamberlin-Courant rules, as well as on approximate variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule, since the original rule is NP-hard to compute. We show that SHIFT BRIBERY tends to be significantly harder in the multiwinner setting than in the single-winner one by showing settings where SHIFT BRIBERY is easy in the single-winner cases, but is hard (and hard to approximate) in the multiwinner ones. We show that the non-monotonicity of those rules which are based on approximation algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant rule sometimes affects the complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY.",

author = "Robert Bredereck and Piotr Faliszewski and Rolf Niedermeier and Nimrod Talmon",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Copyright 2016, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.; 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 ; Conference date: 12-02-2016 Through 17-02-2016",

year = "2016",

month = jan,

day = "1",

language = "American English",

series = "30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016",

pages = "2452--2458",

booktitle = "30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Complexity of shift bribery in committee elections

AU - Bredereck, Robert

AU - Faliszewski, Piotr

AU - Niedermeier, Rolf

AU - Talmon, Nimrod

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - We study the (parameterized) complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY for multiwinner voting rules. We focus on the SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and Chamberlin-Courant rules, as well as on approximate variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule, since the original rule is NP-hard to compute. We show that SHIFT BRIBERY tends to be significantly harder in the multiwinner setting than in the single-winner one by showing settings where SHIFT BRIBERY is easy in the single-winner cases, but is hard (and hard to approximate) in the multiwinner ones. We show that the non-monotonicity of those rules which are based on approximation algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant rule sometimes affects the complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY.

AB - We study the (parameterized) complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY for multiwinner voting rules. We focus on the SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and Chamberlin-Courant rules, as well as on approximate variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule, since the original rule is NP-hard to compute. We show that SHIFT BRIBERY tends to be significantly harder in the multiwinner setting than in the single-winner one by showing settings where SHIFT BRIBERY is easy in the single-winner cases, but is hard (and hard to approximate) in the multiwinner ones. We show that the non-monotonicity of those rules which are based on approximation algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant rule sometimes affects the complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84977557956&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

T3 - 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016

SP - 2452

EP - 2458

BT - 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016

T2 - 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016

Y2 - 12 February 2016 through 17 February 2016

ER -

Complexity of shift bribery in committee elections

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

UN SDGs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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