Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N × N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ, ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1 - ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSTOC 2017 - Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing
EditorsPierre McKenzie, Valerie King, Hamed Hatami
Pages878-889
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)9781450345286
DOIs
StatePublished - 19 Jun 2017
Event49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: 19 Jun 201723 Jun 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
VolumePart F128415

Conference

Conference49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityMontreal
Period19/06/1723/06/17

Keywords

  • Approximate nash equilibria
  • Communication complexity
  • Convergence rate
  • Uncoupled dynamics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software

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