Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


For a constant ϵ, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N×N games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp⁡(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of (ϵ,ϵ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that at least (1−ϵ)-fraction of the players are ϵ-best replying.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)376-398
Number of pages23
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Jul 2022


  • Approximate Nash equilibria
  • Communication complexity
  • Convergence rate of uncoupled dynamics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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