Common-value group contests with asymmetric information

Din Cohen; Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164

Common-value group contests with asymmetric information

Din Cohen, Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study contests between two groups where all the players have a common value of winning. In each group one of the players has an information advantage over the other players. This player is referred to as the dominant player. We show that a group contest is equivalent to a contest between the dominant players, and, as such, the expected total effort of both groups is always the same, while their probabilities of winning as well their expected total payoff are not.

Original language	American English
Article number	109164
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	192
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164
State	Published - 1 Jul 2020

Keywords

Asymmetric information
Group contests

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164

Cite this

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AB - We study contests between two groups where all the players have a common value of winning. In each group one of the players has an information advantage over the other players. This player is referred to as the dominant player. We show that a group contest is equivalent to a contest between the dominant players, and, as such, the expected total effort of both groups is always the same, while their probabilities of winning as well their expected total payoff are not.

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Common-value group contests with asymmetric information

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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