Common-value group contests with asymmetric information

Din Cohen, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study contests between two groups where all the players have a common value of winning. In each group one of the players has an information advantage over the other players. This player is referred to as the dominant player. We show that a group contest is equivalent to a contest between the dominant players, and, as such, the expected total effort of both groups is always the same, while their probabilities of winning as well their expected total payoff are not.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number109164
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume192
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2020

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Group contests

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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