Commission-Rate vs. Fixed-Fee Contract in a Supply Chain of Mobile Apps Involving Risk

Tal Avinadav, Priel Levy

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider a supply chain of a mobile app consisting of a platform and a developer, where demand is uncertain and is affected by the both the selling price and the quality level of the app. Two types of contract are investigated, based on the commission scheme stipulated by the platform: commission rate and fixed fee. For each contract type, we derive closed-form expressions for equilibrium assuming that the parties are risk sensitive. For the case of risk-neutral parties, we provide a numerical comparison.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1144-1149
Number of pages6
JournalIFAC-PapersOnLine
Volume58
Issue number19
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2024
Event18th IFAC Symposium on Information Control Problems in Manufacturing, INCOM 2024 - Vienna, Austria
Duration: 28 Aug 202430 Aug 2024

Keywords

  • commission-rate contract
  • digital supply chain
  • fixed-fee contract
  • pricing
  • quality
  • risk sensitivity

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering

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