Combinatorial voter control in elections

Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters: In our setting, when we choose to add a voter v, we also have to add a whole bundle κ(v) of voters associated with v. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationMathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2014 - 39th International Symposium, MFCS 2014, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages153-164
Number of pages12
EditionPART 2
ISBN (Print)9783662444641
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event39th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, MFCS 2014 - Budapest, Hungary
Duration: 25 Aug 201429 Aug 2014

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
NumberPART 2
Volume8635 LNCS

Conference

Conference39th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, MFCS 2014
Country/TerritoryHungary
CityBudapest
Period25/08/1429/08/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

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