Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality

Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium in n-player games are obtained here, using earlier results of Halpern characterizing these solution concepts using non-Archimedean fields.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)457-473
Number of pages17
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume46
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 May 2017

Keywords

  • Characterizing solution concepts
  • Common knowledge of rationality
  • Perfect equilibrium
  • Quasi-perfect equilibrium
  • Sequential equilibrium

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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