Abstract
Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium in n-player games are obtained here, using earlier results of Halpern characterizing these solution concepts using non-Archimedean fields.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 457-473 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Volume | 46 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 May 2017 |
Keywords
- Characterizing solution concepts
- Common knowledge of rationality
- Perfect equilibrium
- Quasi-perfect equilibrium
- Sequential equilibrium
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty