Character (Alone) Doesn't count: Phenomenal character and narrow intentional content

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. if this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. using a twin- earth style case, i argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, i conclude by considering a few objections that help to further illustrate the problem.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)261-271
Number of pages11
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Volume52
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2015
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

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