Caps in sequential contests

Reut Megidish; Aner Sela

doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12031

Caps in sequential contests

Reut Megidish, Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player can win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	608-617
Number of pages	10
Journal	Economic Inquiry
Volume	52
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12031
State	Published - 1 Apr 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics
General Business,Management and Accounting

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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12031

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abstract = "We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player can win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid.",

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Caps in sequential contests

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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