TY - CHAP
T1 - Capacitism and Phenomenal Variance
AU - Cahen, Arnon
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - In this chapter, I focus on one challenge to Schellenberg’s capacitism, which can be straightforwardly captured by the following trilemma: 1.Capacities First: “Employing perceptual capacities [to discriminate and single out particulars] constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content.”(Schellenberg, this volume, Chap. 28, p. 178) 2. “Individuation Condition: A perceptual capacity Cα is individuated by the mind independent particulars α1, α2, α3, … αn that the perceptual capacity functions to single out.”(Schellenberg, this volume, Chap. 28, p. 180) 3. Phenomenal Variability: The same particular successfully discriminated and singled out (or different particulars of the same type) can be experienced in a wide variety of ways.
AB - In this chapter, I focus on one challenge to Schellenberg’s capacitism, which can be straightforwardly captured by the following trilemma: 1.Capacities First: “Employing perceptual capacities [to discriminate and single out particulars] constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content.”(Schellenberg, this volume, Chap. 28, p. 178) 2. “Individuation Condition: A perceptual capacity Cα is individuated by the mind independent particulars α1, α2, α3, … αn that the perceptual capacity functions to single out.”(Schellenberg, this volume, Chap. 28, p. 180) 3. Phenomenal Variability: The same particular successfully discriminated and singled out (or different particulars of the same type) can be experienced in a wide variety of ways.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85198329489&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52231-4_31
DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52231-4_31
M3 - فصل
T3 - Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
SP - 259
EP - 261
BT - Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
ER -