Abstract
In the ongoing debate about whether the Allies should have bombed the Auschwitz extermination camp, the Soviet Union is rarely mentioned. Focusing on four operational challenges-accuracy, range, time, and intelligence-the authors compare British, American, and Soviet preparedness for such a mission. In addition, on the basis of little-used documentary evidence, they argue that Stalin's refusal to bomb Auschwitz must be attributed not only to his antisemitism, but also to a complicated shift in the Soviet Union's nationalities policy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 90-113 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Holocaust and Genocide Studies |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 2013 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- History
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
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