Abstract
In the ongoing debate about whether the Allies should have bombed the Auschwitz extermination camp, the Soviet Union is rarely mentioned. Focusing on four operational challenges-accuracy, range, time, and intelligence-the authors compare British, American, and Soviet preparedness for such a mission. In addition, on the basis of little-used documentary evidence, they argue that Stalin's refusal to bomb Auschwitz must be attributed not only to his antisemitism, but also to a complicated shift in the Soviet Union's nationalities policy.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 90-113 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Holocaust and Genocide Studies |
Volume | 27 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2013 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- History
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations