Abstract
This paper discusses a common criticism of economic models that depart from the standard rational-choice paradigm - namely, that the phenomena addressed by such models can be ‘rationalized’ by some standard model. I criticize this criterion for evaluating bounded-rationality models. Using a market model with boundedly rational consumers due to Spiegler (2006a) as a test case, I show that even when it initially appears that a bounded-rationality model can be rationalized by a standard model, rationalizing models tend to come with unwarranted ‘extra baggage’. I conclude that we should impose a greater burden of proof on rationalizations that are offered in refutation of bounded-rationality models.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 23-43 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Economics and Philosophy |
Volume | 27 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2011 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
- Economics and Econometrics