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Bribing in first-price auctions: Corrigendum

Maciej H. Kotowski, Shiran Rachmilevitch

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debate

Abstract

We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013).

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)616-618
Number of pages3
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume87
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
    SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

  • Bribes
  • Collusion
  • First-price auctions

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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