Breaking Virtual Memory Protection and the SGX Ecosystem with Foreshadow

Jo Van Bulck; Marina Minkin; Ofir Weisse; Daniel Genkin; Baris Kasikci; Frank Piessens; Mark Silberstein; Thomas F. Wenisch; Yuval Yarom; Raoul Strackx

doi:https://doi.org/10.1109/MM.2019.2910104

Breaking Virtual Memory Protection and the SGX Ecosystem with Foreshadow

Jo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin, Baris Kasikci, Frank Piessens, Mark Silberstein, Thomas F. Wenisch, Yuval Yarom, Raoul Strackx

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Foreshadow is a speculative execution attack that allows adversaries to subvert the security guarantees of Intel's Software Guard eXtensions (SGX). Foreshadow allows access to data across process boundaries, and allows virtual machines (VMs) to read the physical memory belonging to other VMs or the hypervisor.

Original language	English
Article number	8691527
Pages (from-to)	66-74
Number of pages	9
Journal	IEEE Micro
Volume	39
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MM.2019.2910104
State	Published - 1 May 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Software
Hardware and Architecture
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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https://doi.org/10.1109/MM.2019.2910104

Cite this

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AU - Genkin, Daniel

AU - Kasikci, Baris

AU - Piessens, Frank

AU - Silberstein, Mark

AU - Wenisch, Thomas F.

AU - Yarom, Yuval

AU - Strackx, Raoul

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AB - Foreshadow is a speculative execution attack that allows adversaries to subvert the security guarantees of Intel's Software Guard eXtensions (SGX). Foreshadow allows access to data across process boundaries, and allows virtual machines (VMs) to read the physical memory belonging to other VMs or the hypervisor.

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M3 - مقالة

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JO - IEEE Micro

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M1 - 8691527

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Breaking Virtual Memory Protection and the SGX Ecosystem with Foreshadow

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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