'Blackmailing the army' - 'Strategic Military Refusal' as policy and doctrine enforcement: the formation of a new security agent

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Abstract

The study shows how 'strategic military refusal' in Israel developed as a rational and institutional means to influence security policies. As opposed to the perspective that sees military refusal as a spontaneous individual act, the study illustrates how organizations operate to distribute military refusal in order to pressure decision-makers to change their military policies. This strategy has proven to be effective when the military is involved with groups that threaten it with refusal - which threatens the military's operational ability and its official and apolitical image. These include soldiers whose civilian authorities, rather than their military commanders, are perceived as an epistemic authority regarding security issues. The case study refers to the impact of strategic military refusal in Israel on security policies and the military doctrine. This was influenced by leftist groups, which, although they belonged to the parliamentary opposition, had dominant presence in the military ranks. Furthermore, the study examines the effect of the use of strategic military refusal on the model of military recruitment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)297-328
Number of pages32
JournalSmall Wars and Insurgencies
Volume25
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2014

Keywords

  • Gaza
  • Israel
  • Lebanon
  • embedded military
  • epistemic authority
  • security policy
  • strategic military refusal
  • unity of command

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Political Science and International Relations

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