TY - GEN
T1 - Bidding Games with Charging
AU - Avni, Guy
AU - Goharshady, Ehsan Kafshdar
AU - Henzinger, Thomas A.
AU - Mallik, Kaushik
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Guy Avni, Ehsan Kafshdar Goharshady, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Kaushik Mallik.
PY - 2024/9
Y1 - 2024/9
N2 - Graph games lie at the algorithmic core of many automated design problems in computer science. These are games usually played between two players on a given graph, where the players keep moving a token along the edges according to pre-determined rules (turn-based, concurrent, etc.), and the winner is decided based on the infinite path (aka play) traversed by the token from a given initial position. In bidding games, the players initially get some monetary budgets which they need to use to bid for the privilege of moving the token at each step. Each round of bidding affects the players’ available budgets, which is the only form of update that the budgets experience. We introduce bidding games with charging where the players can additionally improve their budgets during the game by collecting vertex-dependent monetary rewards, aka the “charges.” Unlike traditional bidding games (where all charges are zero), bidding games with charging allow non-trivial recurrent behaviors. For example, a reachability objective may require multiple detours to vertices with high charges to earn additional budget. We show that, nonetheless, the central property of traditional bidding games generalizes to bidding games with charging: For each vertex there exists a threshold ratio, which is the necessary and sufficient fraction of the total budget for winning the game from that vertex. While the thresholds of traditional bidding games correspond to unique fixed points of linear systems of equations, in games with charging, these fixed points are no longer unique. This significantly complicates the proof of existence and the algorithmic computation of thresholds for infinite-duration objectives.
AB - Graph games lie at the algorithmic core of many automated design problems in computer science. These are games usually played between two players on a given graph, where the players keep moving a token along the edges according to pre-determined rules (turn-based, concurrent, etc.), and the winner is decided based on the infinite path (aka play) traversed by the token from a given initial position. In bidding games, the players initially get some monetary budgets which they need to use to bid for the privilege of moving the token at each step. Each round of bidding affects the players’ available budgets, which is the only form of update that the budgets experience. We introduce bidding games with charging where the players can additionally improve their budgets during the game by collecting vertex-dependent monetary rewards, aka the “charges.” Unlike traditional bidding games (where all charges are zero), bidding games with charging allow non-trivial recurrent behaviors. For example, a reachability objective may require multiple detours to vertices with high charges to earn additional budget. We show that, nonetheless, the central property of traditional bidding games generalizes to bidding games with charging: For each vertex there exists a threshold ratio, which is the necessary and sufficient fraction of the total budget for winning the game from that vertex. While the thresholds of traditional bidding games correspond to unique fixed points of linear systems of equations, in games with charging, these fixed points are no longer unique. This significantly complicates the proof of existence and the algorithmic computation of thresholds for infinite-duration objectives.
KW - Bidding games on graphs
KW - ω-regular objectives
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85203555804&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.8
DO - 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.8
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs
BT - 35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory, CONCUR 2024
A2 - Majumdar, Rupak
A2 - Silva, Alexandra
PB - Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing
T2 - 35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory, CONCUR 2024
Y2 - 9 September 2024 through 13 September 2024
ER -