@inproceedings{e9b370fa7e814842a62263a1a6f3a9f6,
title = "Best-response auctions",
abstract = "We present a new framework for auction design and analysis that we term {"}best-response auctions{"}. We use this framework to show that the simple and myopic best-response dynamics converge to the VCG outcome and are incentive compatible in several well-studied auction environments (Generalized Second Price auctions, and auctions with unit-demand bidders). Thus, we establish that in these environments, given that all other bidders are repeatedly best-responding, the best course of action for a bidder is to also repeatedly best-respond. Our results generalize classical results in economics regarding convergence to equilibrium and incentive compatibility of ascending-price English auctions. In addition, our findings provide new game-theoretic justifications for some well-studied auction rules. Best-response auctions provide a way to bridge the gap between the full-information equilibrium concept and the usual private-information auction theory.",
keywords = "auctions, best response dynamics",
author = "Noam Nisan and Michael Schapira and Gregory Valiant and Aviv Zohar",
year = "2011",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993633",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9781450302616",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
pages = "351--359",
booktitle = "EC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
note = "12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11 ; Conference date: 05-06-2011 Through 09-06-2011",
}