Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games

Yakov Babichenko

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.007

Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most c nlogn steps for some constant c > 0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e-c'n for some constant ^{c '} > 0.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	130-144
Number of pages	15
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	81
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.007
State	Published - Sep 2013
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Anonymous games
Best-reply dynamic
Rate of convergence

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.007

Cite this

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title = "Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games",

abstract = "We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most c nlogn steps for some constant c > 0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e-c'n for some constant c ' > 0.",

keywords = "Anonymous games, Best-reply dynamic, Rate of convergence",

author = "Yakov Babichenko",

note = "Funding Information: This paper is part of the Ph.D. research of the author at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author wishes to thank his supervisor, Sergiu Hart, for his support and guidance, Itai Arieli for useful discussions and comments, and anonymous referees for useful suggestions and remarks. The author would like to acknowledge financial support by ERC 030-7950-411 and ISF 039-7679-411 .",

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doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.007",

language = "الإنجليزيّة",

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T1 - Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games

AU - Babichenko, Yakov

N1 - Funding Information: This paper is part of the Ph.D. research of the author at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author wishes to thank his supervisor, Sergiu Hart, for his support and guidance, Itai Arieli for useful discussions and comments, and anonymous referees for useful suggestions and remarks. The author would like to acknowledge financial support by ERC 030-7950-411 and ISF 039-7679-411 .

PY - 2013/9

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N2 - We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most c nlogn steps for some constant c > 0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e-c'n for some constant c ' > 0.

AB - We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players n where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most c nlogn steps for some constant c > 0). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least 1-e-c'n for some constant c ' > 0.

KW - Anonymous games

KW - Best-reply dynamic

KW - Rate of convergence

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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.007

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.007

M3 - مقالة

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 81

SP - 130

EP - 144

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 1

ER -

Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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