Best-of-three all-pay auctions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest's stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)67-70
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2011


  • All-pay auctions
  • Best-of-three contests
  • Multi-stage contests

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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