Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another

Sandro Shelegia; Yossi Spiegel

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.003

Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another

Sandro Shelegia, Yossi Spiegel

Coller School of Management

Tel Aviv University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We show that the Bertrand oligopoly model with cost asymmetries may admit multiple Nash equilibria when firms hold passive ownership stakes in each other. The equilibrium price may be as high as the monopoly price of the most efficient firm.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	136-138
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	114
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.003
State	Published - Jan 2012

Keywords

Bertrand oligopoly
Cost asymmetry
Partial cross ownership

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.003

Cite this

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title = "Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another",

abstract = "We show that the Bertrand oligopoly model with cost asymmetries may admit multiple Nash equilibria when firms hold passive ownership stakes in each other. The equilibrium price may be as high as the monopoly price of the most efficient firm.",

keywords = "Bertrand oligopoly, Cost asymmetry, Partial cross ownership",

author = "Sandro Shelegia and Yossi Spiegel",

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KW - Partial cross ownership

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DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.003

M3 - مقالة

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EP - 138

JO - Economics Letters

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Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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