Abstract
Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subject's assertion that p matches her nonverbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 193-203 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Thought |
Volume | 6 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2017 |
Keywords
- behavioral circumscription
- belief
- cross-cultural
- delusions
- folk psychology
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy