Abstract
We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie-breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie-breaking rule used in the auction.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 222-233 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 146 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jul 2024 |
Keywords
- All-pay auctions
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Behavioral strategies
- Incomplete information
- Interdependent types
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
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