Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types

Ori Haimanko

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007

Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types

Ori Haimanko

Department of Economics

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie-breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie-breaking rule used in the auction.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	222-233
Number of pages	12
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	146
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007
State	Published - 1 Jul 2024

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Behavioral strategies
Incomplete information
Interdependent types

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.007

Cite this

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abstract = "We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie-breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie-breaking rule used in the auction.",

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AB - We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie-breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie-breaking rule used in the auction.

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KW - Bayesian Nash equilibrium

KW - Behavioral strategies

KW - Incomplete information

KW - Interdependent types

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

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ER -

Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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