Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with statistically interdependent types (signals) under quite general assumptions on the values, costs and tie-breaking rules. Moreover, the set of equilibria is shown to be the same for any tie-breaking rule used in the auction.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)222-233
Number of pages12
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume146
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2024

Keywords

  • All-pay auctions
  • Bayesian Nash equilibrium
  • Behavioral strategies
  • Incomplete information
  • Interdependent types

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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