Bayesian games with intentions

Adam Bjorndahl; Joseph Y. Halpern; Rafael Pass

doi:10.4204/EPTCS.215.8

Bayesian games with intentions

Adam Bjorndahl, Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass

Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article › peer-review

Abstract

We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games [5], and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	99-113
Number of pages	15
Journal	Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS
Volume	215
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.215.8
State	Published - 23 Jun 2016
Externally published	Yes
Event	15th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2015 - Pittsburgh, United States Duration: 4 Jun 2015 → 6 Jun 2015

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title = "Bayesian games with intentions",

abstract = "We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games [5], and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting.",

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year = "2016",

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doi = "10.4204/EPTCS.215.8",

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AU - Halpern, Joseph Y.

AU - Pass, Rafael

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AB - We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games [5], and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting.

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DO - 10.4204/EPTCS.215.8

M3 - مقالة من مؤنمر

SN - 2075-2180

VL - 215

SP - 99

EP - 113

JO - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS

JF - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS

T2 - 15th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2015

Y2 - 4 June 2015 through 6 June 2015

ER -

Bayesian games with intentions

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