@inproceedings{868987f4bae24284a4080c0e1aaa0a95,
title = "Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts",
abstract = "We study a generalization of both the classic single-dimensional mechanism design problem, and the hidden-action principal-agent problem of contract theory [c.f., Alon et al. 2021]. In this setting, the principal seeks to incentivize an agent with a private Bayesian type to take a costly action. The goal is to design an incentive compatible menu of contracts which maximizes the expected revenue.",
keywords = "approximation, contract theory, simple vs optimal contracts",
author = "Tal Alon and Paul Duetting and Yingkai Li and Inbal Talgam-Cohen",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023 Owner/Author(s).; 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023 ; Conference date: 09-07-2023 Through 12-07-2023",
year = "2023",
month = jul,
day = "9",
doi = "10.1145/3580507.3597795",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
series = "EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation",
pages = "66",
booktitle = "EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation",
}