Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions

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The 2-person equal-loss bargaining solution (Chun Econ Lett 26:103–106, 1988) is characterized on the basis of the following axioms: concavity, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and restricted monotonicity. Replacing symmetry by strong individual rationality and extending the bargaining domain so that it contains a degenerate problem that consists solely of the disagreement point results in a characterization of a weighted version of the equal-loss solution.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)1-9
Number of pages9
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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