@inproceedings{f259ceb653ce49b6b41f53268555cbe4,
title = "Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation",
abstract = "Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks – in particular maximizing welfare truthfully in single-item auctions – quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established that if bidders{\textquoteright} valuation functions are submodular over their signals (a.k.a. SOS), a truthful 4-approximation to the optimal welfare exists. We show existence of a mechanism that is truthful and achieves a tight 2-approximation to the optimal welfare when signals are binary. Our mechanism is randomized and assigns bidders only 0 or 12 probabilities of winning the item. Our results utilize properties of submodular set functions, and extend to matroid settings.",
keywords = "Mechanism design, Submodularity, Welfare maximization",
author = "Ameer Amer and Inbal Talgam-Cohen",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.; 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021 ; Conference date: 21-09-2021 Through 24-09-2021",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3\_3",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9783030859466",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH",
pages = "34--48",
editor = "Ioannis Caragiannis and Hansen, \{Kristoffer Arnsfelt\}",
booktitle = "Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, SAGT 2021, Proceedings",
address = "ألمانيا",
}