Auctions with endogenous opting-out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This article analyzes open ascending and first-price sealed-bid auctions with uncertain value, recursive winning procedure, and cooling-off right in return for an endogenous opting-out fee. I show that although equilibrium bidding strategies in these auctions tend to be less aggressive than in auctions with costless withdrawals, expected revenues are usually higher. Both auctions are spurious-bidding free and the sealed-bid auction is almost shill-bidding robust.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)345-374
Number of pages30
JournalInternational Journal of Economic Theory
Volume17
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2021

Keywords

  • auctions
  • cooling-off rights
  • withdrawal rights

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Auctions with endogenous opting-out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this