Attacks on fixed-apparatus quantum-key-distribution schemes

Michel Boyer; Ran Gelles; Tal Mor

doi:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.90.012329

Attacks on fixed-apparatus quantum-key-distribution schemes

Michel Boyer, Ran Gelles, Tal Mor

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider quantum-key-distribution implementations in which the receiver's apparatus is fixed and does not depend on his choice of basis at each qubit transmission. We show that, although theoretical quantum key distribution is proven secure, such implementations are totally insecure against a strong eavesdropper that has one-time (single) access to the receiver's equipment. The attack we present here, the "fixed-apparatus attack," causes a potential risk to the usefulness of several recent implementations.

Original language	English
Article number	012329
Journal	Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
Volume	90
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.90.012329
State	Published - 21 Jul 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics

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https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.90.012329

Cite this

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Attacks on fixed-apparatus quantum-key-distribution schemes

Abstract

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