Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection

Ron Stajnrod, Raz Ben Yehuda, Nezer Jacob Zaidenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


ARM TrustZone offers a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) embedded into the processor cores. Some vendors offer ARM modules that do not fully comply with TrustZone specifications, which may lead to vulnerabilities in the system. In this paper, we present a DMA attack tutorial from the insecure world onto the secure world, and the design and implementation of this attack in a real insecure hardware.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)259-269
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques
Issue number3
StatePublished - Sep 2022
Externally publishedYes


  • Security
  • TrustZone

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Software
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics


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