Abstract
We present an ascending-price mechanism for a multi-sided market with a variety of participants, such as manufacturers, logistics agents, insurance providers, and assemblers. Each deal in the market may consist of a combination of agents from separate categories, and different such combinations are simultaneously allowed. This flexibility lets multiple intersecting markets be resolved as a single global market. Our mechanism is obviously-truthful, strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and attains almost the optimal gain-from-trade when the market for every allowed combination of categories is sufficiently large. We evaluate the performance of the suggested mechanism with experiments on real stock market data and synthetically produced data.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 104022 |
Pages (from-to) | 104022 |
Number of pages | 1 |
Journal | Artificial Intelligence |
Volume | 325 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2023 |
Keywords
- Multi-sided markets
- Strong budget balance
- Truthful auctions
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Language and Linguistics
- Linguistics and Language
- Artificial Intelligence