TY - GEN
T1 - Arguments of proximity [Extended Abstract]
AU - Kalai, Yael Tauman
AU - Rothblum, Ron D.
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2015.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - An interactive proof of proximity (IPP) is an interactive protocol in which a prover tries to convince a sublinear-time verifier that x ∈ L. Since the verifier runs in sublinear-time, following the property testing literature, the verifier is only required to reject inputs that are far from L. In a recent work, Rothblum et. al (STOC, 2013) constructed an IPP for every language computable by a low depth circuit. In this work, we study the computational analogue, where soundness is required to hold only against a computationally bounded cheating prover. We call such protocols interactive arguments of proximity. Assuming the existence of a sub-exponentially secure FHE scheme, we construct a one-round argument of proximity for every language computable in time t, where the running time of the verifier is o(n)+polylog(t) and the running time of the prover is poly(t). As our second result, assuming sufficiently hard cryptographic PRGs, we give a lower bound, showing that the parameters obtained both in the IPPs of Rothblum et al., and in our arguments of proximity, are close to optimal. Finally, we observe that any one-round argument of proximity immediately yields a one-round delegation scheme (without proximity) where the verifier runs in linear time.
AB - An interactive proof of proximity (IPP) is an interactive protocol in which a prover tries to convince a sublinear-time verifier that x ∈ L. Since the verifier runs in sublinear-time, following the property testing literature, the verifier is only required to reject inputs that are far from L. In a recent work, Rothblum et. al (STOC, 2013) constructed an IPP for every language computable by a low depth circuit. In this work, we study the computational analogue, where soundness is required to hold only against a computationally bounded cheating prover. We call such protocols interactive arguments of proximity. Assuming the existence of a sub-exponentially secure FHE scheme, we construct a one-round argument of proximity for every language computable in time t, where the running time of the verifier is o(n)+polylog(t) and the running time of the prover is poly(t). As our second result, assuming sufficiently hard cryptographic PRGs, we give a lower bound, showing that the parameters obtained both in the IPPs of Rothblum et al., and in our arguments of proximity, are close to optimal. Finally, we observe that any one-round argument of proximity immediately yields a one-round delegation scheme (without proximity) where the verifier runs in linear time.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84943376634&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_21
DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_21
M3 - منشور من مؤتمر
SN - 9783662479995
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 422
EP - 442
BT - Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015 - 35th Annual Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
A2 - Robshaw, Matthew
A2 - Gennaro, Rosario
T2 - 35th Annual Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2015
Y2 - 16 August 2015 through 20 August 2015
ER -