Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions

Amir Danak; Shie Mannor

doi:10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8

Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions

Amir Danak, Shie Mannor

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We suggest approximately optimal bidding strategies for games, where similar items are auctioned repeatedly. Considering players' bounded rationality in practice, the results can further motivate the application of market-based approaches in resource allocation problems. We specialize the bidding algorithm for first-price payment schemes, the building blocks of several simplified selling mechanisms, that are common in practice.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	189-199
Number of pages	11
Journal	Annals of Operations Research
Volume	196
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8
State	Published - Jul 2012

Keywords

Approximation methods
Auctions
Bayesian equilibrium
Decision-making problems
Game theory
Mathematical optimization
Repeated games

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Decision Sciences
Management Science and Operations Research

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10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8

Cite this

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KW - Bayesian equilibrium

KW - Decision-making problems

KW - Game theory

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KW - Repeated games

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JO - Annals of Operations Research

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Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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