TY - GEN
T1 - An optical covert-channel to leak data through an air-gap
AU - Guri, Mordechai
AU - Hasson, Ofer
AU - Kedma, Gabi
AU - Elovici, Yuval
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2016 IEEE.
PY - 2016/1/1
Y1 - 2016/1/1
N2 - In recent years, various out-of-band covert channels have been proposed that demonstrate the feasibility of leaking data out of computers without the need for network connectivity. The methods proposed have been based on different type of electromagnetic, acoustic, and thermal emissions. However, optical channels have largely been considered less covert: Because they are visible to the human eye and hence can be detected, they have received less attention from researchers. In this paper, we introduce VisiSploit, a new type of optical covert channel which, unlike other optical methods, is also stealthy. Our method exploits the limitations of human visual perception in order to unobtrusively leak data through a standard computer LCD display. Our experiments show that very low contrast or fast flickering images which are invisible to human subjects, can be recovered from photos taken by a camera. Consequentially, we show that malicious code on a compromised computer can obtain sensitive data (e.g., images, encryption keys, passwords), and project it onto a computer LCD screen, invisible and unbeknownst to users, allowing an attacker to reconstruct the data using a photo taken by a nearby (possibly hidden) camera. Our research yielding novel attack paradigms that exploit the subtle mechanisms of human visual perception.
AB - In recent years, various out-of-band covert channels have been proposed that demonstrate the feasibility of leaking data out of computers without the need for network connectivity. The methods proposed have been based on different type of electromagnetic, acoustic, and thermal emissions. However, optical channels have largely been considered less covert: Because they are visible to the human eye and hence can be detected, they have received less attention from researchers. In this paper, we introduce VisiSploit, a new type of optical covert channel which, unlike other optical methods, is also stealthy. Our method exploits the limitations of human visual perception in order to unobtrusively leak data through a standard computer LCD display. Our experiments show that very low contrast or fast flickering images which are invisible to human subjects, can be recovered from photos taken by a camera. Consequentially, we show that malicious code on a compromised computer can obtain sensitive data (e.g., images, encryption keys, passwords), and project it onto a computer LCD screen, invisible and unbeknownst to users, allowing an attacker to reconstruct the data using a photo taken by a nearby (possibly hidden) camera. Our research yielding novel attack paradigms that exploit the subtle mechanisms of human visual perception.
KW - Air-Gap
KW - Covert-Channel
KW - Optical
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85019230805&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/PST.2016.7906933
DO - 10.1109/PST.2016.7906933
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - 2016 14th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2016
SP - 642
EP - 649
BT - 2016 14th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2016
T2 - 14th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2016
Y2 - 12 December 2016 through 14 December 2016
ER -