Abstract
We prove that the maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions is the same for all bidders. Our proof is elementary, and does not require that bidders are risk neutral, or that the distribution functions of their valuations are independent or smooth.
| Original language | English GB |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 190-191 |
| Number of pages | 2 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 122 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 2014 |
Keywords
- All-pay auctions
- Asymmetric auctions
- First-price auctions
- Maximal bid
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver