Almost universal forgery attacks on AES-based MAC’s

Orr Dunkelman; Nathan Keller; Adi Shamir

doi:10.1007/s10623-014-9969-x

Almost universal forgery attacks on AES-based MAC’s

Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller, Adi Shamir

University of Haifa, Bar-Ilan University, Weizmann Institute of Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A message authentication code (MAC) computes for each (arbitrarily long) message $$m$$m and key k a short authentication tag which is hard to forge when k is unknown. One of the most popular ways to process m in such a scheme is to use some variant of AES in CBC mode, and to derive the tag from the final ciphertext block. In this paper, we analyze the security of several proposals of this type, and show that they are vulnerable to a new type of attack which we call almost universal forgery, in which it is easy to generate the correct tag of any given message if the attacker is allowed to change a single block in it.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	431-449
Number of pages	19
Journal	Designs, Codes, and Cryptography
Volume	76
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-014-9969-x
State	Published - 6 Sep 2015

Keywords

ALRED
Almost Universal Forgery
Message authentication codes
Pelican

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science Applications
Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1007/s10623-014-9969-x

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Almost universal forgery attacks on AES-based MAC’s

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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