A Robustness Analysis to Structured Channel Tampering Over Secure-by-Design Consensus Networks

Marco Fabris, Daniel Zelazo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This letter addresses multi-agent consensus networks where adverse attackers affect the convergence performances of the protocol by manipulating the edge weights. We generalize (Fabris and Zelazo, 2022) and provide guarantees on the agents' agreement in the presence of attacks on multiple links in the network. A stability analysis is conducted to show the robustness to channel tampering in the scenario where part of the codeword, corresponding to the value of the edge weights, is corrupted. Exploiting the built-in objective coding, we show how to compensate the conservatism that may emerge because of multiple threats in exchange for higher encryption capabilities. Numerical examples related to semi-autonomous networks are provided.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2011-2016
Number of pages6
JournalIEEE Control Systems Letters
Volume7
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023

Keywords

  • Agents-based systems
  • network analysis and control
  • secure consensus protocols

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Control and Optimization

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