A procedural characterization of solution concepts in games

Joseph Y. Halpern; Yoram Moses

doi:10.1613/jair.4220

A procedural characterization of solution concepts in games

Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We show how game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of a knowledge-based program with counterfactual semantics. In a precise sense, this program can be viewed as providing a procedural characterization of rationality.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	143-170
Number of pages	28
Journal	Journal Of Artificial Intelligence Research
Volume	49
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.4220
State	Published - Feb 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Artificial Intelligence

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10.1613/jair.4220

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JO - Journal Of Artificial Intelligence Research

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A procedural characterization of solution concepts in games

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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