A population's feasible posterior beliefs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We characterize which distributions over the empirical distribution of posterior beliefs in the population are feasible. We apply this result in several domains. First, we study the problem of maximizing the polarization of beliefs in a population. Second, we provide a characterization of the feasible agent-symmetric product distributions of posteriors. Finally, we study an instance of a private Bayesian persuasion problem and provide a clean formula for the sender's optimal value.

Original languageEnglish
Article number105764
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
StatePublished - Jan 2024


  • Bayesian persuasion
  • Empirical distributions of posteriors
  • Feasible posterior distribution
  • Polarization

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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