A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

Dominik Karos; Nozomu Muto; Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4

A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

Dominik Karos, Nozomu Muto, Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

University of Haifa

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players’ ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	1169-1182
Number of pages	14
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	47
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4
State	Published - 1 Nov 2018

Keywords

Bargaining
Efficiency-free characterizations
Parametrized solutions

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Access to Document

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4

Cite this

@article{b76575d0661a48e0a7a1c3a5ac087003,

title = "A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions",

abstract = "We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players{\textquoteright} ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.",

keywords = "Bargaining, Efficiency-free characterizations, Parametrized solutions",

author = "Dominik Karos and Nozomu Muto and Shiran Rachmilevitch",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018, The Author(s).",

year = "2018",

month = nov,

day = "1",

doi = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4",

language = "American English",

volume = "47",

pages = "1169--1182",

journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",

issn = "0020-7276",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

AU - Karos, Dominik

AU - Muto, Nozomu

AU - Rachmilevitch, Shiran

PY - 2018/11/1

Y1 - 2018/11/1

N2 - We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players’ ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.

AB - We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players’ ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Efficiency-free characterizations

KW - Parametrized solutions

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85040782355&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4

DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0611-4

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-7276

VL - 47

SP - 1169

EP - 1182

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

IS - 4

ER -

A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this