A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria

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Harsányi [4] showed that Bayesian games over finite games of payoff uncertainty with finite sets of belief types always admit Bayesian equilibria. That still left the question of whether Bayesian games over finite games of payoff uncertainty with infinitely many types are guaranteed to have equilibria. Simon [7] presented an example of a Bayesian game with no measurable Bayesian equilibria, even though the underlying game of payoff uncertainty is finite. We present a new and shorter proof of Simon's result using a simpler Bayesian game that moreover does not even have measurable approximate equilibria. That game in turn is used as the basis for constructing another Bayesian game which has no Bayesian equilibria at all, even in non-measurable strategies, in a construction complementary to one appearing in Friedenberg and Meier [1].

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)138-151
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Sep 2014


  • Approximate equilibria
  • Bayesian games
  • Existence of equilibria
  • Incomplete information

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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