A case for maximum wage

Tomer Blumkin; Efraim Sadka; Yotam Shem-Tov

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.004

A case for maximum wage

Tomer Blumkin, Efraim Sadka, Yotam Shem-Tov

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Tel Aviv University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper we demonstrate that supplementing the optimal non-linear income tax system with a binding maximum wage rule attains a Pareto improvement, by serving to mitigate the mimicking incentives of the high-skill individuals without entailing distortions.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	374-378
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	120
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.004
State	Published - 1 Sep 2013

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

Keywords

Maximum wage
Optimal income tax
Redistribution

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics
Finance

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.004

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title = "A case for maximum wage",

abstract = "In this paper we demonstrate that supplementing the optimal non-linear income tax system with a binding maximum wage rule attains a Pareto improvement, by serving to mitigate the mimicking incentives of the high-skill individuals without entailing distortions.",

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AU - Sadka, Efraim

AU - Shem-Tov, Yotam

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.004

M3 - Article

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

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A case for maximum wage

Abstract

UN SDGs

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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