Abstract
This article deals with three situations in which a man and a woman who are the genetic parents of a child, agree that the father's genetic parenthood will have no practical and legal significance and that the mother will serve as the sole parent, for the purpose of all rights, responsibilities and obligations. (1) An agreement to deny parenthood made at the stage when the mother is pregnant, or shortly after birth; (2) a sperm donation from an anonymous donor; and (3)a sperm donation from a known donor.The first part of the article presents three lines of thought that relate to different aspects of the situation. One line of thought is based on the contractual point of view. The second focuses on the best interests of the child and the distinction between the best interests of the hypothetical future child and those of the specific child. The third is focused on the right to parenthood. The article shows that none of the explanations proposed is sufficient to provide a coherent explanation for the existing position of Israeli law and/or to provide a satisfactory policy for regulating these three situations.The second part of the article presents an alternative approach. This approach seeks to replace the private aspect reflected in each of the views discussed above with a broad network of thinking about parenting known as the “institutional-public approach to parenting”. The article explains that Israeli law rejects the “agreement to deny parenting” because it contradicts the need to shape parenthood as an institution that reflects irreversible, non-commercial responsibility, focused on the best interests of the child and the relationships between the children and parents. The article will further argue that because of their support for the right to parenthood of single mothers, Israeli law and Western law in general, seek to construct a social category of “donor”, referring to the “right” person to help women or couples realize their desire to become parents. The article proposes some mechanisms and limitations that may permit the donation mechanism without undermining the institution of parenthood and the ethos this represents. The position that rejects donation from a known donor is justified because this creates a category of “partial” parenting that may harm the well-being of the child. In addition, it also blurs the line between categories and opens the door for a person to act as a quasi-parent without taking full responsibility for his/her children, thus harming the concept of the “parenting institution”.
Translated title of the contribution | Consensual paternity denial |
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Original language | Hebrew |
Pages (from-to) | 231-309 |
Number of pages | 79 |
Journal | משפטים |
Volume | 61 |
Issue number | 1 |
State | Published - 2021 |
IHP publications
- ihp
- Children's rights
- Consent (Law)
- Contracts
- Custody of children
- Fatherhood
- Intention
- Joint custody of children
- Mother and child
- Parent and child
- Parent and child (Law)
- Parents
- Paternity
- Pregnant women -- Legal status, laws, etc
- Responsibility
- Sperm donors