רכישות ממונפות : סימפטום של משק ריכוזי או אמצעי לצמצום ריכוזיות?

Translated title of the contribution: Leveraged Buyouts:: A Symptom of a Centralized Market or Means for Minimizing Centralization?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In the case of Vardnikov vs. Alovitch, the Tel-Aviv District Court has assumed that leveraged buyouts are a symptom of centralized markets, and are suspect to be an additional form of tunneling in which owners squeeze out value from the firm. As a consequence, the court has imposed the Enhanced Business Judgment Rule on such transactions. In this Article, I argue to the contrary: not only that leverage buyouts are not a negative symptom of centralized markets, they actually curtail market centralization by enabling the expansion of the number of potential owners. As a consequence, leveraged buyouts should not be treated by courts suspiciously and should be reviewed under the more lenient Business Judgment Rule.
Translated title of the contributionLeveraged Buyouts:: A Symptom of a Centralized Market or Means for Minimizing Centralization?
Original languageHebrew
Pages (from-to)293-317
Number of pages25
Journalמחקרי משפט
Volume31
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2017

IHP publications

  • ihp
  • Conflict of interests
  • Corporate governance
  • Corporation law
  • Decentralization in management
  • Dividends
  • Executives
  • Financial leverage
  • Judicial review
  • ביקורת שיפוטית
  • דיני חברות
  • חלוקת רווחים
  • מנוף פיננסי
  • נושאי משרה בחברות
  • ניגוד עניינים
  • ריכוז וביזור
  • רכישה ומכירה של חברות
  • רכישה ממונפת
  • שליטה (חברות)

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