Abstract
The general meeting of shareholders is a key element of any joint-stock company and plays a vital role in corporate governance. Various company law provisions,particularly those tailored for the unique characteristics of the Israeli capital market, where companies with controlling shareholders are prevalent, rely on effectively functioning general meetings. For optimum results, general meetings must be attended by shareholders who are unbiased by personal interests that conflict with the company’s best interests. However, shareholders often must incur expenses to attend general meetings, which leads to rational indifference among public-company shareholders. To address this indifference, the Israeli capital market has embraced the “online era” by enabling shareholders in Israeli public companies to cast their votes on line, which significantly reduces the costs involved. This article examines how online voting has changed the institutional dynamics of general shareholder meetings of Israeli public companies. The analysis of the involvement of controlling shareholders, institutional investors, and public shareholders shows that the online era has established public shareholders (retail investors) as an additonal influential body in general meetings, alongside the controlling and institutional investors. This article explains the significance of this development and the need for further review the need to require institutional investors to participate in general meetings in the online era.
Translated title of the contribution | An Institutional Analysis of the General Meeting of Shareholders in the Era of Online Voting |
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Original language | Hebrew |
Pages (from-to) | 221-244 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | מחקרי רגולציה |
Volume | ח' |
State | Published - 2024 |
IHP publications
- ihp
- Financial institutions
- Stockholders
- Corporations
- Capital market
- Corporate governance
- Delegated legislation
- Investments