On the Impossibility of Cryptography with Tamperable Randomness

Per Austrin, Kai Min Chung, Mohammad Mahmoody, Rafael Pass, Karn Seth

نتاج البحث: نشر في مجلةمقالةمراجعة النظراء

ملخص

We initiate a study of the security of cryptographic primitives in the presence of efficient tampering attacks to the randomness of honest parties. More precisely, we consider p-tampering attackers that may efficiently tamper with each bit of the honest parties’ random tape with probability p, but have to do so in an “online” fashion. Our main result is a strong negative result: We show that any secure encryption scheme, bit commitment scheme, or zero-knowledge protocol can be “broken” with advantage Ω (p) by a p-tampering attacker. The core of this result is a new algorithm for biasing the output of bounded-value functions, which may be of independent interest. We also show that this result cannot be extended to primitives such as signature schemes and identification protocols: assuming the existence of one-way functions, such primitives can be made resilient to [InlineEquation not available: see fulltext.]-tampering attacks where n is the security parameter.

اللغة الأصليةالإنجليزيّة
الصفحات (من إلى)1052-1101
عدد الصفحات50
دوريةAlgorithmica
مستوى الصوت79
رقم الإصدار4
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرنُشِر - 1 ديسمبر 2017
منشور خارجيًانعم

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • !!General Computer Science
  • !!Applied Mathematics
  • !!Computer Science Applications

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